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ABSTRACT
The German coalition government by the Social Democrats and the Greens is preparing to introduce a second crucial reform 
concerning the immigrant population. After the 1999 reform of the nationality law, Germany is taking another step towards 
modelling a comprehensive and long expected organised immigration policy, concluding for the first time officially that Germany 
is not only a country of immigration, but to state that further immigration is needed. Yet, while citizenship politics in Germany is 
departing from old ethnic conceptions with the possibility for immigrant children to acquire citizenship by birth and a reduction of 
the requirements for naturalisation, policies for (labour) migration still remain in an attitude known from the past: immigrants 
are only “wanted” if they fit to the structural needs of the labour market and the economy. Thus, the planned immigration law 
is in danger to repeat the failure of former guest-worker policies when treating immigrants just as workers. German immigration 
policy seems to remain a purely selective mechanism in the global contest for the best qualified labour migrants.
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INTRODUCTIÓN
The German writer Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1994: 11ff) compared the arrival of  
foreigners in a country with passengers entering a compartment already occupied by two 
other passengers. Even if  the passengers who are already sitting in the compartment do 
not know each other they will feel a curious solidarity and association. They perceive the 
newcomer as a disturbance to their former cosiness. Their ‘own territory’ is at stake. There 
is smouldering antipathy against the ‘invaders’ and, although there is normally no open 
conflict, the ‘invaders’ will be stigmatised by the old-established passengers, even when they 
have become more and more used to them. One can apply this compartment analogy to 
Europe, and especially Germany, which is discursively perceived in public as facing ‘floods’ 
of  immigrants who are potentially ‘swamping’ the European (German) cultural system and 
allegedly pose a threat to the “integrity of  the nation” (Mitchell/Russell, 1996: 56). One 
cannot resist recalling the deep fear of  the spectre of  communism that haunted Europe 
more than 150 years ago. Today European governments see migration as a major threat, 
already chosen as the main object of  combat being intertwined with drug trafficking and 
organized crime.2  After the attacks on the capitalist and politico-militarist symbols of  
American power on September 11 a dangerous link is emerging, not only in Germany: 
the danger of  equating migrants with terrorists. This linkage casts a negative light on the 
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 1 I am indebted to Lyndsey Remner, Rachel Teear and Prof. Dr. Goetze 
for remarks and suggestions.
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unfolding positive discourse about migration in Germany. The positive effects of  migration 
on welfare and the economy of  the host-country are counterbalanced and already detached 
from public and political discourse by concerns for strengthening control measures against 
migrants and talks about internal security. In that wake of  reshaping internal and external 
borders for migrants, work on the progressive and long awaited bill on migration and 
integration was suspended. Now, at the end of  2001, the first ever parliamentary act 
on immigration in Germany still needs to be implemented. Yet, one cannot deny the 
importance and significance of  such a law to regulate migration and integration. Most 
importantly it states for the first time that Germany is already a country of  immigration and 
that it needs immigration. This paper basically focuses on the content and effects of  this 
German immigration bill. However, first there will be a short overview of  the migration 
movements after World War II and also some statistical remarks on the extent of  the 
immigrant population in Germany. Then, second, follow some theoretical considerations 
about the German way of  thinking and organising immigration and integration, thereby 
relating citizenship and immigration politics to the wider context of  what can be called 
population management. After a short description of  current foreigners legislation, I will 
present a more or less comprehensive view on the new Immigration Bill by the German 
government. Concluding the article, I will try to analyse what kind of  progress could be 
gained by this law and finally I will display some short-comings of  this bill. 
THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE WITH MIGRATION IN THE LATE 20TH CENTURY
First of  all, it seems necessary to specify what kind of  migrants I will be focusing on 
in this essay. Basically it is important to note that when we are talking about migration 
to Germany, we can distinguish between at least five groups of  immigrants in Germany: 
Ethnic Germans, EU citizens, non-EU citizens, asylum-seekers or refugees, and family 
members of  permanent immigrants (Rotte, 1998). In the present context I will concentrate 
on (labour) migrants coming from non-EU countries who are already permanent residents 
in Germany or are regarded as migrating to Germany under the new immigration act 
planned. As the above-mentioned categorization of  migrants indicates, Germany’s attitude 
towards foreigners can be labelled as deeply hierarchical. This hierarchy means that some 
foreigners are legally privileged and some are not. In contrast to the EU-citizens and the 
Aussiedler (ethnic Germans) all other foreigners fall under the provisions and regulations 
of  the Ausländerrecht (foreigners law) which is basically directed at policing migrants. The 
latter category of  foreigners contains the guest-worker generation, their offspring and 
families as well as asylum-seekers and refugees. However, before going further into detail 
with the German immigration policy, I will sketch the development of  (labour) migration 
to Germany. 
 2 This attitude is codified in the Schengen Implementation Agreement 
(19.6.1990), and the decisions made by the “TREVI”-Group. “Schengen” 
and also the Dublin Convention on the State Responsible for the 
Examination of an Asylum Claim (15.6.1990) are crucial results of the 
informal intergovernmental cooperation process (to which “TREVI” 
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The history of  labour migration to Germany since 1945 is one of  a constantly growing 
population of  immigrants. Due to the economic boom starting in the 1950s and despite a 
huge refugee movement from the Soviet Zone of  Germany before 1961 – three million 
refugees emigrated from there to the Federal Republic – problems arose with filling certain 
jobs, e.g. in agriculture, so that a recruitment treaty was concluded with Italy in 1955. The 
urgent need for expansion of  productive capacities and manpower consequently led to a 
widening of  labour recruitment, which was only temporarily interrupted in the mid-sixties, 
when many employment contracts were not renewed using the foreign “guest workers” as 
an “economic buffer to protect the native workforce against unemployment” (Thränhardt, 
1996: 203) due to signs of  economic crisis. However, to bridge the still rising surplus 
demand for low qualified seasonal jobs, Germany re-opened the door to expanding the 
“guest-worker-programme” to workers from non-EEC countries. In 1970, two years after 
the concluded recruitment treaty, Yugoslavs already outnumbered the Italians, and from 
1973 on Turks were the most numerous foreign nationals.3  The recruitment stop in 1973 
happened to be a policy change towards stricter regulation of  immigration. However, it 
did not necessarily stop labour migration in general (Hammar, 1985: 6). Legal immigration 
was basically only possible from EC countries. Yet, while the numbers of  foreign workers 
sank sharply after the recruitment stop and the oil crisis, it increased again from the 
beginning of  the eighties due to the family unification policy for foreign workers and the 
rising numbers of  asylum-seekers, especially towards the end of  the eighties.
In the aftermath of  the German reunification there have not only been big immigration 
movements by Aussiedler who are considered to be ethnic Germans but also by additional 
labour migrants strongly needed by the industry who came to Germany mostly in order to 
reunite their families (Thränhardt, 1996: 214).4  Together with an increase in the numbers 
of  asylum-seekers and refugees in the wake of  the wars in former Yugoslavia and further 
family reunification, the numbers of  foreigners rose during the nineties. Yet, although the 
total number of  immigrants rose, the numbers of  incoming migrants was coming closer to 
the numbers of  emigrating foreigners. In the years 1997 and 1998 there were even more 
emigrating foreigners than immigrants (Figure 1). A new category of  immigrants was 
occurring with the tightening of  the Schengen regime. The numbers of  illegal immigrants 
increased and it is (unofficially) estimated that there are up to one million immigrants living 
illegally in Germany. This is lamented by the Bundesregierung (Federal government) and is 
taken as a pretext to conceive even stricter immigration control measures.
Figure 1: Immigration and Emigration of  Foreigners in Germany (1991-1999)
refers) in the fields of security and public order that begun in the 1970s. 
For details on “Schengen” see King (1994) and Lavenex (1997). In 
general both agreements are framed as measures of security and take 
a tough stance on the internal and external control with regard to third 
country nationals, especially to non-EU nationals. Although “Schengen” 
was initially an intergovernmental agreement, the Amsterdam Treaty 
made the ratification of the Schengen Agreement an essential prerequisite 
for joining the European Union, see Gimbal (1998).
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Source: Federal Statistical Office, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung vom 24./25. 10. 2000. 
Official statistics show that at the end of  1999 there were 7 343 591 foreigners living 
in Germany.5  This number constituted a share of  8.9 % of  the total residential population. 
With this percentage Germany ranks third within the European Union, behind Luxembourg 
and Austria, which have a share of  34.16 % and 9.09 % respectively, and just in front of  
Belgium, which has a share of  8.86 %. Italy, Greece (both 1.54 %), Spain, Finland (both 
1.55 %), and Portugal (1.76 %) have the lowest share of  foreigners in the population 
of  the European Union.6  The foreign population is constantly increasing. At the time 
of  the recruitment stop for labour migrants in 1973 there were already almost 4 million 
foreigners living in Germany (6.4 %). By the end of  the eighties the share of  foreigners 
 3 The high level of emigration caused serious disruptions to the 
labour markets in the sending countries, e.g. 34 % of all skilled workers 
in Turkey went abroad between 1965 and 1975, see Thränhardt (1996: 
was still below 8 % (approximately 4.9 million). Between 1987 and 1993 the share increased 
from 6.9 % to 8.5 %, or from 4 240 500 to 6 878 100 foreigners. Since 1995 the share of  
foreigners living in Germany has remained at a constant level of  just below 9 % of  the 
total residential population, as can be seen in Table 1. 
Table 1: Population and Foreigners in Germany as at 31 December 1999.
Key Date                 Population in 1,000            Foreigners in 1,000         Per cent
Former federal
territory
1973                        62,090.1                             3,966.2                            6.4
1980                        61,653.1                             4,453.3                            7.2
1989                        62,679.0                             4,845.9                            7.7
1990                        63,735.7                             5,342.5                            8.4
Germany after
unification
1991                        80,274.6                             5,882.3                            7.3
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1995                        81,817.5                             7,173.9                            8.8
1999                        82,163.5                             7,343.6                            8.9
Source: Federal Statistical Office, see Federal Ministry of  the Interior (2000: 14).
Remarkably, the proportion of  foreigners living in the Federal Länder of  Western 
Germany is higher than that of  Eastern Germany, e.g. the largest proportion lives in 
Hamburg (19.15 %), followed by Berlin (14.32 %), Hesse (13.96 %), Bremen (12.22 %), 
Baden-Württemberg (12.11 %) and North-Rhine/Westphalia (11.02 %), whereby nearly 
70 % of  all migrants in Germany live in the large Länder Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, 
Hesse and North-Rhine/Westphalia (Kraus, 2000: 250). In contrast, Brandenburg has the 
highest share of  the Eastern Länder with just 2.03 %. This split is also manifested in the 
share of  foreign population in German cities (Table 2). In the West the biggest proportion 
of  foreigners in the residential population is to be found in Frankfurt (30.1 %), Stuttgart 
(24.1 %), Munich (23.6 %) and Cologne (20.5 %). The Eastern city with the biggest share 
of  foreigners is Leipzig (3.1 %), followed by Dresden (2.9 %) and Halle/Saale (2.5 %).7  
Table 2: Number of Foreigners in chosen German Cities as at 31 December 1995
Cities                        Residential Population               Foreigners            Foreigners (%)
Frankfurt/Main        650.100                                 195.400             30.1
Stuttgart                   585.600                                 141.300             24.1
Munich                     1.236.400                              292.100             23.6
Cologne                    965.700                                 197.900             20.5
Hamburg                  1.707.900                              274.700             16.1
Berlin                       3.471.400                              449.500             12.9
Leipzig                     470.800                                 14.600               3.1
Rostock                    227.500                                 4.000                 1.8 
Source : Federal Statistical Office.
Table 3: Number of  Foreigners broken down by chosen nationalities as at 31 December 1999
204f).
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Nationality                1994                   1996                  1998                    1999
                          1.000       %       1.000       %       1.000      %       1.000         %
Total                  6,990.5    100.0  7,314.0   100.0    7,319.6  100.0    7,343.6    100.0
Europe1             5,780.2     82.7   6,000.8    82.1     5,879.9   80.3     5,927.7     80.7
EU-States2         1,564.6     22.4   1,836.6    25.1     1,851.5   25.3     1,856.0     24.3
Greece               355.6       5.1      362.5      5.0       363.5     5.0       364.4        5.0
Italy                    571.9       8.2      599.4      8.2       612.0     8.4       615.9        8.4
Spain                  132.4       1.9      132.5      1.8       131.1     1.8       129.9        1.8
Turkey               1,965.6     28.1   2,049.1    28.0     2,110.2   28.8     2,053.6     28.0
Yugoslavia3         834.8      11.9     754.3     10.3      719.5     9.8       737.2      10.0
Africa                 292.1       4.2      298.7      4.1       349.5     4.8       300.7        4.1
America             179.7       2.6      189.6      2.6       199.4     2.7       205.4        2.8
Asia                    662.4       9.5      745.4     10.2     7808.0   11.0      825.0     11.2 
Source: Federal Statistical Office, see Federal Ministry of the Interior (2000: 16).
1) includes the territory of  the former Soviet Union; 
2) Finland, Austria and Sweden became full members of  the EU on 1 January 1995 
3) Federal Republic of  Yugoslavia
If  you take a closer look at the statistics by means of  splitting the foreign population 
according to the hierarchy introduced above (EU citizens and non-EU citizens), it is 
revealed that foreigners from non-European Union countries constitute three quarters of  
the entire foreign population (Table 3). The biggest proportion of  citizens in the European 
Union comes from Italy, followed by Greece (8.4 % and 5.0 % of  the foreign population 
respectively). With 28.0 % and 10.0 % of  the foreign population most of  the migrants 
come from Turkey and from the countries of  former Yugoslavia respectively. Keeping in 
mind that EU citizens and Aussiedler are privileged by law, it is striking discriminatory that 
the vast majority of  foreigners are living under regulations and provisions that make them 
second class inhabitants in a country what has become their Heimat (home). Some 52 % 
of  the 7.3 million foreigners as at 31 December 1999 had been living in Germany for at 
least 10 years. Approximately 32 % had been living in Germany for 20 years or more. They 
have been working in Germany, paying for social security, producing a second and a third 
generation of  whom many feel no bonds with the parents country of  origin. 
IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION AS PART OF  POPULATION MANAGEMENT
Basically the German immigration experience can be conceived as moving from 
an economically “demand-determined front door migration” to a “supply-driven side 
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door or illegal back door immigration” (Straubhaar, 2000: 8ff).8  Yet, to conceive or 
present migration to Germany purely schematically in this way is to display its facets 
one-dimensionally. Germany’s reaction to immigration can generally be described as an 
underlying reluctance against any inflow of  migrants (Martin, 1996) and, complementary 
to this, as a genealogy of  seeing migration policy as the management of  rights and control 
in relation to migrants (Morris, 2000). Consequently, German immigration policy lacks 
a fundamental axiom of  any policy labelled “immigration policy”: to provide effective 
measurements for integration. However, it remains an irony of  German immigration 
politics that the concept of  integration is alarmingly void of  content, at least content 
which is agreed upon.9  There is ubiquitous public and political discourse about integration. 
However, it seems that integration is considered by the integrating society as being 
basically connected with inclusion into the labour market and the social order respectively. 
Additionally, going beyond the socio-structural context, there is an underlying attitude 
that integration also has an identificatory dimension, an “us” versus “them” dichotomy. 
Although this differentiation is a semantic one and therefore rather symbolic in nature, it 
sets meaningful connotations of  exclusion (Rauer/Schmitdke, 2001: 290). What follows 
from this is that the concept “integration” acts like a “multi-vocal” symbol (Turner, 1974) 
in public (and in academic) discussion. “Integration” operates within these discourses as a 
concept with a plurality of  meanings and different levels of  abstraction of  which all have 
certain imperatives to act. In regard to immigration policies we have to accept both the 
state and politics/politicians in general as the most powerful institutions in presenting the 
political and legal definitions, norms, regulations, identifications etc. By setting the terms 
of  the public discourse the state and the politicians influence profoundly the operative 
meaning of  “integration“. Thus in public discourse integration seems to be a matter of  
employment, citizenship rights or language skills, while immigrants view integration from 
an opposite perspective. They interpret the official (German) integration claim as forcing 
them to identify with and assimilate into the “host-culture”, a claim which is perceived to 
be illegitimate (Rauer/Schmitdke, 2001: 290).
This contrasting view on integration by both immigrants and German public is 
fundamentally entrenched in a fatal premise concerning immigration and especially 
citizenship politics. Despite all regulations over the years that brought doubtless 
improvements for immigrants it is obvious that a deep ambiguity exists in German 
migration politics (Thränhardt, 1996).10  Generally one has to see German migration 
policies within the context of  the discourse of  national identity and socio-economic 
benefits of  migration.11  This fits the argument concerning the stance on being no country 
of  immigration, a claim that “articulates not a social or demographic fact but a political-cultural norm, 
an element of  national self-understanding” (Brubaker, 1992: 174). The national-identity dimension 
was the driving force behind the CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union/Christian 
 4 The high number of Aussiedler (around one million per year in 1989 
and 1990) soon caused repercussions, e.g. housing problems. Aussiedler 
were the main object of discontent (besides the asylum-seekers) within the 
indigenous population, as they were not considered to be real Germans 
and were only motivated to migrate for economic reasons, see Thränhardt 
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Social Union) agitation against the new nationality law by the middle-left government 
of  Social Democrats and the Greens in 1999. This law has introduced, in principle, the 
ius solis into German nationality legislation for the first time, replacing the pure ethnic 
conception of  nationality (ius sanguinis). The conservative opposition was worried about 
the reform, which was perceived as an attack on the national identity and even a redefining 
of  the German Volk (Buckow/Yildiz, 1999: 58), and tried to stop the law with what can 
be called a propaganda war, asking publicly for signatures against the planned law (visiting 
the CDU/CSU-campaign stands in the inner cities one could often hear questions like 
“where can I sign against those foreigners?” etc.).12  
The debate about reforming the German nationality law highlighted, as I describe 
elsewhere (Wydra, 2001: 48-59), a special aspect of  immigration policies by nation-states. 
Immigration policy is not just a matter of  curbing migration to or integrating immigrants 
in a country. It is a tactic within the wider strategy of  population management in general, 
something that Foucault (1999) called the bio-politics of  population. With this he meant 
the political, social and economical organization and administration of  life in a given 
territory, in this case the nation-state. The concept of  population management refers 
to a functional rationalization of  governing. Governing should solve problems that are 
typically for populations, e.g. problems concerning family, housing, living and working 
conditions as well as public health issues, levels of  economic growth, standard of  living, 
and not to forget patterns of  migration, either domestic or from the outside (Dean, 1999: 
99).13  In the present context population management means that the state takes care of  the 
general welfare of  its population. This also includes the incorporation and integration of  
immigrants in the domestic society and the societal structures as well as the control and 
regulation of  the conditions and the processes of  migration movements in general. Thus 
population management by the state comprises the “well being” of  the societal body as well 
as the security of  the territorial border of  the nation-state. While the (external) immigration 
control measures to Germany are woven into the multi-layered system of  the fortification 
of  Europe,14  (internal) immigration policies that have to be seen as integration policies are 
part of  domestic social politics. One can observe a close relation between regulations of  
admission and social rights that are granted to immigrants, as can be seen in the graded 
ensemble of  immigrant statuses in Germany. For example, people form Eastern Europe 
(1996: 214f). Public discontent led to the establishment of special entry 
rules for Aussiedler (e.g. they have to produce proof of their German 
origin). Additionally the federal government reacted by cutting back 
social benefits. However, Aussiedler are still privileged compared to 
migrants from non-EU countries and asylum-seekers.
 5 Federal Ministry of the Interior (2000: 14).
 6 Source EUROSTAT, from 10 January 2001, in Bundesamt für die 
Anerkennung ausländischer Flüchtlinge, 2001: 18). The figures are for 
the year 1998. The figure for Luxembourg dates back to 1 January 1997, 
(Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2000: 15).
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considered to be ethnic Germans are granted full citizenship rights just upon arrival, while 
labour migrants from Eastern Europe enjoy a much smaller set of  rights. The connection 
between social rights and immigrant status is reflecting the close relation between welfare 
and immigration. Being in line with my bio-political argument, a welfare-state regime can 
be conceived as “the specific institutional arrangements adopted by societies in the pursuit 
of  work and welfare” for the population (Esping-Andersen, 1987: 6). Connected to this, 
immigration policy regimes are institutional arrangements and mechanisms to regulate 
and organise the admission and the integration of  immigrants. There exists a correlation 
with the continental welfare-state regime and strict immigration control policies. As Faist 
(1995a, 1995b, 1998) argues, there exists a striking correspondence between conservative 
models of  welfare-state regimes, like the German one, and a restrictive immigration policy 
model, the Schengen model, “with strict immigration control, permitting only economically necessary 
guestworkers and efforts to control tightly refugees and family reunification” (Faist, 1995b: 222).15 
The reason for such a strict immigration control seem more or less obvious. It is a 
strategy to secure the benefits of  the welfare-state for the ingenious population. At least 
this is the way arguments are made, not only by rightist or conservative parties but also 
by social-democratic based parties, like the election campaign in Denmark in November 
2001 has recently shown. Thus, immigration control within welfare-state context appears 
to constitute a mechanism of  social closure. Following that the discourse of  immigration 
is mostly overshadowed by a differentiation between “us” and “them”. The means for this 
differentiation is the use of  the concept ethnicity. Additionally, ethnicity is also used as a 
strategy to form an ethnic based elite within the society (Kössler/Schiel, 1995). Immigrants 
are excluded from central positions, resources etc. just because they are different and are 
not belonging to the (ethnically defined) national community. In Germany this strategy 
has two dimensions. First, it is connected to citizenship politics. The acquisition of  
German citizenship was, until 1999, particularly based on ethnic difference, which was 
constructed out of  a womb of  national myths about a homogenous community. Second, 
this differentiation is generally present in the discourse about immigration and immigrants. 
However, in former years it was more or less under the surface of  public awareness, because 
the officially held myth was expecting the aliens to go someday and therefore ethnic 
difference was not emphasised as a problem in public and political discourse (Schönwälder, 
1996). This situation changed in the late eighties and beginning nineties, mostly because of  
two reasons. On the one hand, German reunification was demanding a re-consideration 
 7 Source: Federal Statistical Office, as for 31 December 1995.
 8 “Front door migration” is to be understood as the recruiting of 
workers from the Mediterranean countries when structural shortages of 
unskilled labour occurred at the beginning of the sixties. Consequently, 
“side door” refers to family reunification or refugees and “back door” 
to migrants entering Germany illegally.
 9 This is even verified by Beck, the Ausländerbeauftragte 
(Commissioner for Matters Relating to Foreigners) of the federal 
government, in her recent report on the situation of foreigners in Germany, 
which she is required to submit every two years (Kraus, 2000). 
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of  the question of  national identity, on the other ethnicization was revolving around the 
issue of  welfare-state retrenchment and an sharp increase in the numbers of  migrants, 
especially asylum-seekers and Aussiedler, in the years between 1989 and 1992.
ETHNIC SEMANTICS AS THE BASIS OF  THE GERMAN FOREIGNERS LAW
The growing ethnicization of  German immigration politics over the past few decades 
(Faist, 1995b), was particularly one that displayed itself  in the nationalist discourses about 
the restriction of  the right for asylum at the beginning of  the nineties, although this process 
of  ethnicization may have been triggered off  by various causes, like the economic burden 
of  the reunification process or the longing for a stabilised national identity. However, it is 
with the very beginning of  what can be called welfare-state retrenchment or reconstruction 
that trans-national migration and the integration of  immigrants into the state and society 
emerged as a visible political issue.16  Clearly, when arguing thus one must keep in mind 
that ethnicization in regard to migrants was already in existence, noting that neither its 
conflict potential nor its underlying causes have really been discussed (Schönwälder, 1996). 
Ethnicization is an effective instrument in immigration politics. Both ethnic and national 
categorizations and identifications are part of  the processes and practices to establish and 
maintain a congruency between the (territorial) state and the indigenous population that is 
the national community. Modern states are functionally differentiated political systems. This 
means that these systems establish their authority for internal political regulation, thereby 
succeeding in making collectively binding decisions. This authority is externally restricted 
and internally it is merely claimed within a territorially delimited communicative space 
(Bommes, 1994). Joppke (1998: 6) is right in stating that this territorial state is a strange 
anomaly in a world perceived as based on non-territorial, functional differentiation: “This 
functional order integrates individuals only in specific respects (e.g. as workers, consumers, or churchgoers), 
but never in their totality, thus requiring them to be multiply orientated and allied, and in this sense 
perpetually flexible and mobile. States are an exception to this. They include the individual as a whole 
and involuntarily by ascription at birth, further expecting her to be attached to just one state among a 
plurality of  similarly conceived states, and not to change this attachment over a lifetime.”17  While this is 
not the place to contest the reality of  nation-state per se and especially nation-state-based 
policies on immigration,18  it has to be asserted that state authority depends genuinely on 
ethnic and national semantics. Ethnic identifications and ethnic semantics are potentially 
useful mechanisms to legitimate political action as well as backing the articulation of  
claims made by the national community. However, ethnic and national categorizations are 
not only part of  public and political discourses. In these discourses the social difference 
between immigrants – who are allegedly posing a problem for the structural integration 
of  the welfare-state regime – and the ingenious population is presented as a cultural one, 
as a difference based on national identity. These categorizations are manifested in juridical 
practices based on and articulated through law. The German Ausländergesetz (foreigners law) 
 10 This can be seen best in the juxtaposition of “national principles” 
concerning incoming ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) and “universalist 
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sets the basis for the terminology concerning immigrants. The juridical definition says that 
one is a foreigner who is not German (Foreigners Law, § 1.2). Because being a German is 
basically defined ethnically, this differentiation constituted an “ethnic boundary” (Barth, 
1969). While one could consider this merely a symbolic separation between ingenious and 
immigrant population, it constitutes the chance to impose special laws and regulations 
on immigrants, not only in regard to political rights (which was mainly a struggle for the 
acquisition of  citizenship), but concerning social and economic rights. Thus, in Germany 
the reformed Ausländergesetz from 1993 is a graded categorisation of  immigrants statuses 
with the aim to integrate foreigners (guest-workers) and their families into the society, to 
balance the supply and demand of  (foreign) labour, and to regulate employment rights and 
the access to the labour market as well as to social benefits. The underlying conception 
of  the foreigners law is to regulate the status of  foreign residents in Germany according 
to what can be labelled “civic stratification”. The Ausländergesetz fulfils thereby important 
control and distribution functions within the welfare-state system: “Central amongst them 
are job protection, welfare protection, surveillance and deterrence, albeit in the context of  trans-national 
obligations” (Morris, 2000: 237). Thus the German foreigners law conceives a hierarchy of  
limited and unlimited resident statuses including residence permits but also residence titles 
for special or exceptional purposes. The different statuses are connected to different rights 
concerning social benefits, employment rights etc.19  To receive German citizenship at the 
end of  a naturalisation process one has to run through all of  the statuses, however always 
keeping in mind the impending fact that there residential status is insecure until they will 
become a German citizen. Table 4 gives an overview of  the statuses.
Table 4: Residence status of  foreigners living in Germany as at 31 Dec. 1999
Total number of  foreigners in Germany:
of  those                                                                         7,343,591
Right of  unlimited residence                                          824,099
Limited residence permit                                                1,757,746
Unlimited residence permit                                            2,027,128
EC residence permit                                                      760,807
principles connected to asylum-seekers” (Lash/Urry, 1994: 185). 
Consistently, the official German phraseology speaks of Aussiedler as 
refugees and of asylum-seekers as foreign refugees.
 11 The national identity dimension manifests itself best in the politics 
of citizenship and the heated debate about the provisions of conferment 
of citizenship, see Brubaker (1989, 1992), Fulbrook (1996), Buckow/
Yildiz (1999), Wydra (2001). The socio-economic dimension is best 
seen in the Green Card initiative by the federal government, which 
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Residence title for specific purposes                               231,231
Residence title for exceptional purposes                         173,718
Rest1                                                                               1,568,862                             
Source: Central Aliens Register, see Federal Ministry of  the Interior (2000: 40). 
1) this includes people staying in Germany under Duldung (toleration), people under the age 
of  16 as long as they do not need a residence authorisation, and people who don not have (yet) a 
residence authorisation at all.
If  it is correct to state that modern political power gains its form not through 
the domination of  subjectivity and subjects but that this power depends on a web of  
technologies for erecting and maintaining the self-government of  the individuals/citizens 
(Miller/Rose, 1990: 28), this statement is also true for the regulations conceived in the 
German Ausländergesetz. This feature of  self-government means that immigrants have 
to fulfil and in fact have to learn to be in compliance with and adapt actively to the 
requirements of  the provisions of  the foreigner law. This is not only true in regard to the 
established hierarchy of  the Aufenthaltsstatus (status of  residence) but also (and especially) 
to meeting the rules for acquiring citizenship. One must understand this as a process of  
adapting these requirements as a step towards integration into German society. This reflects 
the long held stance that immigrants have to integrate (that means to assimilate) and even 
convert to a fully-fledged member of  society.20  Full political, social and cultural (citizenship) 
rights have been viewed on as the target of  integration, not as the beginning of  integration. 
Brubaker suggests that the legal changes concerning citizenship politics in Germany may 
be indicative of  a slight but still significant “assimilationist turn” without giving way to the 
former belief  that complete assimilation is the prerequisite for citizenship. He states that, 
“the liberalization of  naturalization law broke expressively with this principle, previously enshrined in the 
regulations governing naturalization. The new practices, policies, and discourses surrounding citizenship 
are assimilationist, rather, in the sense of  politically recognizing, legally constituting, and symbolically 
emphasizing commonality rather than difference. Assimilation, (…) means becoming similar, or treating 
as similar, and this new inflection in the policies and practices of  citizenship in the 1990s has involved 
a modest but significant assimilationist turn in both senses” (Brubaker, 2001: 538f). Just to get 
an impression of  what Brubaker views as the “assimilationist turn” one has to review 
the processes and changes in German citizenship law and immigration policies from the 
beginning of  the 1990s. To begin with the (temporary) end, the significant change in 
immigration policy in general occurred with the advent of  the new coalition government 
of  the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN) in 1998. 
started in 2000. The Green Card was introduced to provide incentives 
for foreign IT-specialists to come and work in Germany. Here, one can 
see clearly an example of the substitution and complement functions 
of labour migrants to fill certain jobs, which are vacant, because there 
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For the first time it was officially recognised that Germany is a country of  immigration.21  
The new government called for a reform of  the nationality law as the “vital element” of  
their immigration policy and implemented the Act to Amend the Nationality Law, which 
took effect on 1 January 2000. It ended a period of  almost one hundred years of  citizenship 
law based purely on ethnic criteria (ius sanguinis).22  However, one has to ask why any salience 
should be laid on citizenship law? Here is not the place to develop the genealogy and the 
multiple dimensions of  the concept of  citizenship. For the present context it is sufficient 
to view and conceptualise citizenship as a mechanism for modern nation-states of  sorting, 
identifying and classifying people, especially considering migration. Consistent with that 
citizenship is an instrument of  exclusion, inclusion, separation, closure, differentiation, 
and restriction (Brubaker, 1992: ix-xi). Similarily, citizenship laws are referring to the role 
of  the nation-state as “controller, regulator or gatekeeper” (Hammar, 1990: 29).23  Before 
the reform of  German nationality law citizenship politics in Germany were part of  what 
can be labelled anti-immigration policy. German citizenship policies reflected a deep 
societal ambivalence concerning foreigners. On the one hand the strict provisions were an 
expression of  profound mistrust in regard to the migrant population, and on the other it 
was officially asserted that the will to integrate these migrants was the driving force behind 
all policies towards the foreign fellow-citizens, even if  the official policies were exactly the 
obstacle to achieve this aim (Hagedorn, 2001: 220).24  Citizenship politics in Germany as 
elsewhere remain, even after the positive reform of  the nationality law, an instrument for 
regulating and controlling the immigrant population in a certain way. This is also true for 
the reform bill to control and limit immigration to Germany.
THE BEGINNING ERA OF  A POSITIVE IMMIGRATION POLICY?
The plans for this bill were publicly not only introduced as the start of  a new chapter 
in immigration policy but also as the turning point from an anti-immigration policy to an 
immigration policy that is worth its name. What are the new provisions of  Schily’s Bill 
to Control and Limit Immigration and to Regulate the Residency and the Integration of  
Citizens of  the European Union and Foreigners (Entwurf  eines Gesetzes zur Steuerung und 
Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und Integration von Unionsbürgern und 
Ausländern)?25  This article can only provide a short overview.26  The central amendments 
compared to current (valid) law can be divided into the aspects concerning: (a) new 
structures; (b) labour migration; (c) family reunifiction; (d) admission on humanitarian 
grounds; (e) obligation to leave the country; (f) social benefits; (g) integration; (h) provisions 
concerning citizens of  the European Union and (i) asylum procedure.
(a): The core of  the coming immigration act will be a restructuring of  the Ausländergesetz 
exists a lack on German computer and communication specialists. It 
is widely recognised that immigration was essential for the German 
Wirtschaftswunder (economic boom) after World War Two. Generally, 
it is proved that immigration has at the final count a positive influence 
on the economical, social and demographical development of Germany 
(Loeffelholz/Köpp, 1998).
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with special focus on residence and employment (Residence Act). The previous residence 
status should be reduced to and replaced by a (limited) residence permit and an (unlimited) 
“settling permit”. The act is guided by the purposes of  the stay (e.g. employment, family 
reunification or education) and not by the former residence status. Additionally a new 
Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees) will 
be installed. This agency will mainly be responsible for the co-ordination of  information 
regarding labour migrants between the different administrative bodies, the labour 
administration and the embassies in the sending countries. Furthermore it will manage an 
optional recruiting system for labour migrants, develop a general programme on integration, 
be in charge of  the Ausländerzentralregister (central foreigners register) and finally execute 
measures to promote the voluntary return of  migrants and asylum seekers (chapter 7, § 
74 of  the immigration bill).
(b): Labour migration  is now generally regulated according to regional requirements. 
It will be organised more flexibly so that the labour administration gains more control 
and ability to regulate the influx of  migrants. The employment permit will be conferred 
together with the residence permit (one-stop-government). Highly skilled labour migrants, 
on the other hand, will gain direct access to a settling permit right from the beginning (ch. 
2, § 19). Additionally a special selection procedure is introduced as an optional instrument 
to find a limited number of  “specially qualified” migrants who may receive an entry 
permit (ch. 2, § 20). This selection is dependent on criteria such as self-maintenance and 
vocational training, as well as age, language skills, relations to Germany and the country 
of  origin.27 
(c): Family reunification is also one of  the core issues of  the bill. The planned provisions 
have already fuelled hot dispute between the coalition partners, because only children 
of  “high-skilled” migrants with a settling permit are allowed to follow their parents up 
to the age of  18 (ch. 2, § 27ff). Otherwise (for low-skilled migrants, asylum-seekers and 
refugees) the possibility to follow would exist only up to the age of  12. Additionally late 
arrivals are prone to discretionary practices of  the administration which are based on 
various conditions, e.g. sufficient language skills in order to facilitate integration. Yet, 
if  the family as a whole wants to migrate to Germany, children are generally allowed to 
follow up to the age of  18.28 
(d): The provisions for admission on humanitarian grounds specify former legislation 
considered by the government to have produced unsatisfactory results. Basically strict 
differentiation is introduced to distinguish between people who cannot return and people 
 12 The conservative agitation was mainly raised against the 
Doppelpass (dual citizenship) claiming that a person can not split 
his (political) loyalty. This protest was successful. The ban on dual 
citizenship was not removed by the reform of the nationality law and is 
still official policy. However, as it was under the former conservative 
government, while immigrants who apply for German citizenship have 
generally to renounce their previous citizenship, empirical data show 
that the exception of retainment of one’s previous citizenship is in fact 
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who do not want to return to their country of  origin. The practice of  Duldung (toleration) of  
those who are refused asylum but cannot be deported because of  the absence of  documents 
etc. will be cancelled.29  The government pursues the aim to promote the voluntary return 
of  people who are obliged to leave the country. In that context some provisions found in 
the Schengen-Agreement are included. These refer to the issue of  securing identification 
of  migrants when they apply for visas. People from “Problemstaaten” (problematic states) 
are forced to provide their fingerprints and a photograph of  themselves.30  Migrants 
who convey false information about their identity or nationality will be prosecuted and 
eventually deported.
(e) and (f): The new amendments refer to persons obliged to leave the country (non-
consolidated right of  residence) and asylum-seekers. From now on they should receive 
benefits according to the Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz (Act on Benefits for Asylum-Seekers) 
for the whole period of  their asylum procedure.31  
(g): Another salient part of  the bill is concerned with the measures to improve 
integration of  migrants and foreigners in general (ch. 3, § 44f). The Federal Government 
aims at developing legislation to create state-based facilities for integration incentives like 
language courses, introductions into the juridical and cultural system of  Germany, as well 
as German history. Foreigners who reside permanently in Germany will be given the right 
to claim for integration courses. There will be compulsory language courses for people 
without command of  the German language who have been living in Germany for less than 
six years. As stated before, general language skills and basic knowledge of  the societal system 
and the general living conditions in Germany are key criteria for gaining an (unlimited) 
settling permit, the decisive step towards acquiring citizenship by naturalisation.32  
(h) and (i): These parts of  the bill focus on the elimination of  the residence permit 
for citizens of  the European Union, who are merely subject to an obligatory registration. 
The most remarkable amendment within the asylum procedures is the elimination of  the 
possibility for asylum-seekers to change from the asylum-procedure to the process of  
immigration on grounds of  employment, which has up until now been the case.
All of  the provisions briefly sketched above signal the very beginning of  a new era in 
immigration policy in Germany. The Act to Reform the Nationality Law of  15 July 1999, 
whose main provisions took effect on 1 January 2000, was aimed to facilitate integration 
of  foreigners and migrants. Though this act can be considered the cornerstone of  the 
new German immigration policy that provides the opportunity for immigrants to become 
a citoyen with all rights and duties (Laubach, 2001), the long awaited re-conceptualisation 
the rule (Çinar, 1994).
 13 See also Ivison (1998). Governing is not an abstract concept, it 
is strictly oriented at the implementation of norms, rules regulation etc. 
Dean (1999: 102) stresses that “all modern forms of government of the 
state need to be understood as attempting to articulate a bio-politics 
aimed at enhancing the lives of the population through the application 
of the norm, with the elements of a transformed sovereignty that targets 
subjects within a given territory and whose instrument is the law.”
 14 For a specific description of the “fortification” of Europe towards 
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of  immigration policy adds the external dimension of  controlling the entry to Germany 
(connected with a basic outline of  further integration measurements) to internal integration 
efforts (nationality law). Yet, while the bill is indeed a step towards recognising Germany 
as an Einwanderungsland, it still does not mean equal treatment for all people residing and 
living in Germany. The main critique hinges on humanitarian aspects with respect to 
refugees which appear to be worsening. However, the regulations concerning immigration 
are also considerably incomplete on other grounds.
CRITICAL REMARKS ON THE NEW IMMIGRATION LAW
I will give just a brief  sketch of  the shortcomings of  Schily’s bill on immigration. First 
and maybe the most discriminating part of  the new provisions is the bi-partition of  migrants 
in high-skilled and low-skilled labour migrants. The settling permit is a juridically stable 
status, yet it is conferred only to highly-qualified migrants (e.g. for computer specialists, 
engineers and executive personnel in science and research). Only their children are allowed 
to follow up to the age of  18. All other migrants are granted an insecure residence permit 
and are dependent on discretionary practices of  both government and authorities when 
prolonging it as well as when applying for the settling permit after a certain period of  time. 
Their children are only allowed to join them up to the age of  12. Critics stress correctly 
that this provision contradicts the axiom of  equality under article 3 of  the German Basic 
Law. Only when children join their father/parents right from the beginning is the age 
limit set at 16. This means, as Prantl (2001) asserts, that a normal (low-skilled) worker 
is more or less forced to bring his family with him even if  he is unsure whether or not 
he will more or less successfully integrate into the host-society. Generally, this provision 
contradicts European (Union) standards where the age at which children are allowed to join 
their parents is oriented towards the majority of  the children.33  Additionally, one cannot 
dismiss the basic rights – article 6 of  the German Basic Law – concerning marriage and 
the family which also refer to foreigners. 
Second, the requirements for granting a settling permit are too hard to meet, especially 
for the vast group of  older, ill-educated and untrained immigrants that have been living in 
Germany for many years – some of  them for over twenty years. It is expected that many 
of  the 1.7 million immigrants holding a limited residence permit will not be able to claim 
for the unlimited settling permit (Laubach, 2001: 28). Third, connected with this is the 
non-specification or absence of  any criteria for granting and extending residential permits. 
Consequently, the bill leaves the applicants in a state of  insecurity, fusing the residence 
of  a migrant with the somewhat mysterious “interests of  the Federal Republic of  Germany 
that have not to be interfered with or endangered” (Immigration Bill, ch. 2, § 5.1.3.).34  Fourth, 
the relation between labour administration and foreigner authorities is not yet specified 
the East, see Mihalka (1994) and Convey/Kupiszewski (1995).
 15 Esping-Andersen (1990) distinguishes “three worlds of 
welfare capitalism.” He classifies a liberal (Anglo-Saxon countries), 
a conservative (Continental Europe) and a social democratic regime 
(Scandinavian countries).
 16 Faist (1995: 220) claims that class-race cleavages have developed 
in German welfare-state politics, especially since the late 1980s, which 
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so that both organisations are allowed to withdraw the residential permit according to 
their own specific regulations. Other shortcomings of  the bill include first and foremost 
provisions concerning asylum-seekers and refugees, e.g. people who stay in Germany 
under the special status of  Duldung (toleration) are in danger of  sliding into illegality when, 
according to the bill, this kind of  status is removed.35  Judicial doubts are raised concerning 
the proper legitimacy because the Bundestag (Parliament) and the Bundesrat (Chamber of  
the Federal Länder) are excluded – according to the bill – from decisions about size and 
detailed regulations of  immigration.
Yet, one has to concede that there is still debate about modifications within the coalition 
government in Germany, and it is to be expected that the Greens, who favour a more 
liberal stance on immigration, will succeed in some respects. However, the discussions are 
overshadowed by the consequences of  the terrorist attack on America. Schily took the 
opportunity to connect the conceptualisation of  the immigration law with the tightening 
of  domestic security measures to curb and control extremist foreigners who want to enter 
German territory or are already residing there. That is why there will be only moderate 
modifications and these are not yet known, especially because the federal government 
also needs the approval of  the Bundesrat to pass the law and the coalition government 
of  the Social Democrats and the Greens does not have a majority in it. Therefore one 
has to wait and see how the detailed provisions will be in the end. The original plan to 
pass the law by Christmas 2001 seems highly improbable and so it will be spring 2002 
when the final decision will be made over this bill. Of  course, that is just an hypothetical 
estimation, because with the beginning of  2002 Germany will already be in the wake of  
the electoral campaign for the parliamentary vote held towards the end of  2002. And as 
the 1999 campaign against the reform of  the nationality law has shown, immigration is a 
considerably explosive issue and the conflicting partisan positions of  the different parties, 
especially the Greens and the CDU/CSU, appear to be rather irreconcilable. So, because 
the government needs the approval of  the CDU/CSU in the Bundesrat, this bill, at least 
in the present form, may never become reality.
CONCLUSIONS
Nevertheless, as already stated, this bill has prepared the ground for the recognition 
that Germany needs and will need immigration and that Germany has to handle this issue 
within parameters that include not only integration but also the possibility of  civil and 
political articulation of  migrants. The new bill seems to open the door to a positive step 
towards a reasonable immigration policy in Germany. Besides its fundamental correction 
of  the fictitious stance on not being a country of  immigration it introduces “integration 
courses” that are, although compulsory in nature, a clear approach to preparing migrants 
better for what can be seen as the “fight for membership” (Mackert, 1999) of  German 
he considers to be the period of retrenchment of welfare-state politics in 
general. Most importantly is the type of welfare regime determines both 
the “admission and the selection of immigrants (immigration policies), 
and the politics affecting the insertion of labour immigrants into the 
political and socio-economic life of the country of settlement (immigrant 
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society. Now, forty years after the signing of  the recruitment treaty with Turkey (30.10.1961) 
and with more than 2.4 million Turks living in Germany, an immigration and integration 
policy will be conceived which is formulated in a positive way. 
However, recognising the dawn of  an immigration rather than an anti-immigration 
policy is not to forget that the specific regulations concerning migrants from non-EU 
countries are still woven into a web of  keeping and handling migrants as a separate part 
of  society. Migrants are still focused on under the regulations of  the foreigners law. It is 
true that with the new nationality law, children of  migrants are granted German citizenship 
when meeting certain provisions. Yet, the bulk of  migrants remain in the above mentioned 
organised hierarchy of  privileged foreigners from EU countries, Aussiedlern and migrants 
from non-EU countries. And while the new bill pretends to amend the positions of  
immigrants with the reduction of  residential status for foreigners it simply reorganises 
this hierarchy within the group of  non-privileged foreigners. This is because immigration 
is still conceived under terms of  economic advantages that can be derived from certain 
migrants. The differentiation between high-skilled and low-skilled migrant workers is quite 
discriminatory. This categorisation follows the dictum that some migrants are useful for 
German society and some are not, as the Bavarian Minister of  the Interior asserted a couple 
of  times. Yet, the usefulness of  a migrant is not measured according to the particularity 
of  a person or their social capital, rather the value of  the migrant depends on his skills 
and especially on the requirements of  the German economy. It may be legitimate that a 
nation-state selects the migrants who are allowed to enter. This is polemically reflected in the 
wide held belief  that the societal capacities to integrate foreigners are already overstrained. 
However, one has to ask how this practice is in line with any democratic principles referring 
to equality or even the standards of  the human rights regime at all.
What is inherent in the new developing strategy of  German immigration policy is the 
shift and embedding of  immigration and also integration control from within German 
territory and society beyond the borders. Germany’s intended immigration policy is woven 
into the multi-layered and expanding system of  the fortification of  Europe. It will already 
select the immigrants in the countries of  origin. Immigrants will therefore be treated as 
applicants for jobs and not as people, of  whom cultural and social benefits could be gained. 
Yet, a rigid selection process may undermine fundamental requirements for Germany in 
economic, political, cultural and social perspective. This considerably true when connecting 
a rigid selection process with the nationalist discourse that are sidelining every policy 
on immigration and immigrants and enjoy widespread resurgence. Thus Faist is right in 
asserting that „the analysis of  available empirical evidence suggests that nationalist-populist policies also 
have the greatest potential to undermine social rights of  populations in the receiving welfare states, because 
a strict enforcement of  the rotational principle and the extra-territorial status of  migrant labour could 
create precedents for radical deregulation of  labour markets and social rights“ (Faist 1995b: 245).
Generally, it seems that there must be a considerable amount of  (labour) migration 
to Germany in the future, merely to minimize the decrease in population. However, as 
policies).” This argument is in line with viewing German migration 
politics as part of a bio-political management of societal life.
 17 Also see Bommes and Halfmann (1994). In this context, Brubaker 
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Hradil (2001) states, this would probably only minimize the shift of  the age structure. Yet, 
migration is not expected to level the ageing of  the employees or the lack of  fee-paying 
members of  the welfare system. Hradil assumes that there must be up to five million 
immigrants to per year to level the age structure and avoid increases in pension spending. 
Immigration of  this scale hardly appears to be politically acceptable considering the ongoing 
general security discourse about migration. The prospect of  the EU enlargement is already 
raising fears of  increasing numbers of  immigrants from Eastern European countries. 
Yet, because general expectations are going to see more and more migrants coming from 
other than the European cultural sphere, the task of  integrating migrants will get even 
harder. Here one can see that integration is not only a juridical matter connected with the 
acquisition of  citizenship or the adaptation of  the national identity, however conceived, 
but also a very sociological one due to being highly “visible” as a “foreigner” because 
of  different habits, appearance and so on. This is further complicated by the failure of  
political practice in the past, first, to correct general negative attitudes towards migrants 
and, second, to cling to an ethnic definition of  nationality and national identity. It is surely 
right to assert that policies to increase labour migration will be problematic to promote 
considering, for example, the large-scale unemployment in Germany. This is not to say 
that labour migration contributes to unemployment but that unemployment is successfully 
used as a strategic argument against immigration of  any scale.
Finally, to answer the question if  Germany is moving on migration, one has to state: it 
is moving. From a symbolical point of  view this “moving” is quite a big jump away from 
archaic concepts of  immigration policy or, as the case of  the reform of  the nationality law 
has shown, in regard to citizenship politics. However, these reforms are just a little step 
when seen from a political perspective. Additionally, to a great extent the reforms are not 
the sole effort of  German politicians at all. To some the truth is not always palatable and 
so the German government does not recognise that they are just producing an immigration 
policy that is the forced consequence of  the developments of  the past German immigration 
experience and that Germany is just beginning to meet the political reality that emerged with 
nearly 10 % immigrants (and their dependants) living in Germany. And while Germany is 
definitely on the way to move in a positive direction in regard to immigration policy, it is 
still facing at least two important tasks that have to be solved. First, there is the problem 
of  nationalist-populist policies and discourses that are portraying immigrants as a burden 
for the host society. Additionally, these policies and discourses still seem to succeed in 
denunciating liberal immigrant policies to „mean unrestricted immigration policies“ (Faist, 1995b: 
245) and therefore are producing hate against foreigners. Second, even if  the situation of  
immigrants in Germany is improving, immigrants are still not fully included (like in all 
other states of  the European Union) into the political and social order of  the European 
Union. As Føllesdal states, immigrants are „(i)nvisible in the eyes of  the European polity, they 
are socially dead in the political order of  the European Union“ (Føllesdal, 1999: 108). Considering 
that the states and the societies of  Europe are moving closer, this is another critical task 
for any future immigration policy.
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